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COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT AND THE SEARCH
FOR INTEGRATION
Ronald J. Rychlak*
INTRODUCTION
The American coast is a vital, thriving economic force of great importance
to the nation. Although it comprises less than ten percent of the land mass of
the United States, more than seventy-five percent of the population now lives
within fifty miles of coastal areas, and that percentage is growing.1 As a natu-
ral resource, the coast is "richer than the Rocky Mountains, [and] more bio-
logically important than even the wildlife of Alaska."' Common law has long
recognized coastal waters as corridors for water-borne commerce and as areas
where the public is free to fish.8 The Supreme Court has held that rights in the
coast are so important that without their free availability this nation never
could have developed.' Congress has repeatedly recognized the "[i]mportant
ecological, cultural, historic and esthetic values in the coastal zone which are
essential to the well-being of all citizens." 5 The executive branch has also ex-
pressed great concern for the nation's coast, and went so far as to declare 1980
"The Year of the Coast."6
* Associate Professor, University of Mississippi; J.D., 1983, Vanderbilt University; B.A., 1980,
Wabash College. The author would like to thank Richard McLaughlin and Laura Howorth, of the
Mississippi-Alabama Sea Grant Consortium, for their comments on an earlier draft of this
Article.
I. Morganthau, Hager, Brown, Kenney & Drew, Don't Go Near the Water, NEWSWEEK, Aug.
I, 1988, at 42, 47 [hereinafter Morganthau]; O'Dell & Howorth, Alabama Tidelands After Phil-
lips Petroleum v. Mississippi: Time to Reinvigorate the Public Trust, 20 CUMB. L. REV. 365, 365
(1989-90).
2. Houck, Ending the War: A Strategy to Save America's Coastal Zone, 47 MD. L. REV. 358,
405 (1988).
3. See, e.g., Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 667 (1891) ("It is, indeed, the susceptibility to use as
highways of commerce which gives sanction to the public right of control over navigation upon
[coastal waters]."). See generally Rychlak, Thermal Expansion, Melting Glaciers, and Rising
Tides: The Public Trust in Mississippi, II Miss. C.L. REV. 95 (1991) (in press) (discussing the
history of the public trust doctrine). For this reason, it has been held "inconceivable" that any
person should claim a private property interest in the navigable waters of the United States.
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1913).
4. Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 414 (1842). This is the rationale under-
lying the public trust doctrine as it applies to coastal property. See Rychlak, supra note 3, at 114-
19.
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1451(e) (1988); see also id. § 1452(2)(B) (announcing the congressional policy
to encourage and assist programs to provide for "the management of coastal development to mini-
mize the loss of life and property caused by improper development").
6. President Carter made this proclamation in the last year of his term in office. Environmental
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The environmental health of the coastal zone, however, is not sound. The
Council on Environmental Quality estimates that twenty-four percent of the
nation's 85,240 shoreline miles is "significantly eroding."'7 Development, water
pollution, air pollution, toxins, and other matters all threaten this critical
habitat. 8 The federal government took steps to protect the coast by, inter alia,
enacting the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 ("CZMA"). 9 CZMA is
premised on the belief that, with coordination between various levels of gov-
ernment and various agencies within any one level, coastal development can be
controlled and environmental damage to the coast can be limited.' 0
Priorities and Programs, Message to the Congress, 1979 PUB. PAPERS 1353, 1362 (Aug. 2, 1979).
President Reagan, who embraced the concept of federalism, saw a much smaller role for the
federal government in the protection of the coast. See generally Archer & Knecht, The U.S.
National Coastal Zone Management Program-Problems and Opportunities in the Next Phase,
15 COASTAL MGMT. 103, 107-08 (1987) (analyzing coastal zone management programs at the
state and federal levels).
7. 1988 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY 18TH & 19TH ANN. REP. 105-06. This erosion includes
about one-third of the Great Lakes shorelines and 43 % of the conterminous oceanic coastline. Id.;
see also Houck, supra note 2, at 369 (describing the rapid erosion of the Louisiana coastline).
Perhaps the most dramatic examples of severe coastal problems are in Louisiana. Louisiana is
losing approximately 50 square miles of coastline, an area the size of the District of Columbia,
each year. Id. at 359 n.6. This rate of loss is expected to double over the next ten years. Id.
8. Morganthau, supra note 1, at 43 ("[R]esponsible environmentalists say [it] is now a full-
blown national crisis: the wholesale contamination of U.S. coastal waters by millions of tons of
sewage, garbage, toxic chemicals and other contaminants.").
9. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1988). CZMA has been amended several times. The 1976
amendments, Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-370, 90 Stat.
1013, were largely prompted by the 1973 Arab oil embargo and efforts to accelerate development
of the Outer Continental Shelf ("OCS"). See 16 U.S.C. § 1456a(h) (1988). The 1978 amend-
ments dealt mainly with oil exploration on the OCS. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amend-
ments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629, 690. The 1980 amendments require "protection
of natural resources, including wetlands, flood plains, estuaries, beaches, dunes, barrier islands,
coral reefs, and fish and wildlife and their habitat, within the coastal zone." Coastal Zone Im-
provement Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-464, 94 Stat. 2060. The 1986 amendments reduced federal
funding of certain programs from 80% to 50%, changed the way in which state coastal programs
were evaluated and modified, and revised the estuarine sanctuary provisions of CZMA. Coastal
Zone Management Reauthorization Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 124 (1986). The
1990 amendments, among other things, make clear that CZMA applies to offshore oil exploration,
establishes grants for continued improvement of state plans, authorizes awards for coastal protec-
tion, and requires protection of coastal resources from nonpoint source water pollution. Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 6201, 104 Stat. 1388 (hereinafter
CZMA 1990 Amendments] (Statutes at Large page breaks are not available for this act; citations
to CZMA 1990 Amendments in this Article are to the appropriate section of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990). For a general review of CZMA 1990 Amendments, see Howorth,
Coastal Zone Management Act: Highlights of the 1990 Amendments. 10 WATER LOG II, 12
(1990) (calling these amendments "the most significant mandate for the continued administration
of the nation's only comprehensive coastal management program since the passage of the original
Act").
10. Of course, the concept of governmental protection of the coast has not gone without
criticism.
[Tihe planning elite will be in a position to allocate coastal resources in the "right"
way; no more motels, trailer parks, small beach cottages, apartments, condominiums,
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Effective protection of the coast requires consideration of the many ways
that coastal resources are damaged. Over the past decade it has become in-
creasingly clear that pollution in one medium can have implications in an-
other. For example, the combustion of fossil fuels releases gases that can re-
turn to earth in the form of acid rain, harming aquatic life and damaging soil
fertility. Similarly, heavy metals, such as cadmium and lead, which are emit-
ted through combustion, can return to the land or sea and work their way into
the food chain. For this reason, effective environmental protection requires in-
tegration. Every decision affects later options. To illustrate: In the 1970s,
many areas stopped burning trash and outlawed the burning of leaves because
of concern about air pollution. That increased the amount of waste being
taken to the dump. Today, many landfills are filling up, and waste disposal has
become a serious problem. Thus, the solution of one problem has added to a
new problem. The only way to avoid this quandary is to develop an integrated
environmental plan that focuses on solutions that have the least net adverse
impact on the environment as a whole.
It is appropriate to consider CZMA as one studies the concept of integrated
environmental protection, because it is the federal government's first major
experiment with an integrated environmental program." Unlike other environ-
mental statutory schemes, CZMA does not focus on one specific type of pollu-
tion (for example, air or water pollution). Instead, it sets forth a plan to pro-
tect an entire region from the effects of development and pollution in all their
various forms. To do this, CZMA calls on local, state, and federal governmen-
tal units each to play a role. Unfortunately, this experiment in integration has
not been altogether smooth. CZMA has been called a "complex and not
wholly integrated piece of legislation."' 2 The Act has, however, been amended
or restaurants-those awful developments created by the common man exercising his
vulgar tastes in the unrestricted marketplace. Instead, the "priceless" marshes, bird
refuges, fragile cliffs, and majestic views will be preserved. The superior tastes of the
common man. As [a] Coastal Commissioner ...said, "It's never a pleasant task to
save someone from themselves [sic]."
Johnson, Some Observations on the Economics of the California Coastal Plan, 49 S. CAL. L. REV.
749, 756 (1976) (footnote omitted). For a discussion of coastal management programs prior to
enactment of CZMA, see D. BROWER & D. CAROL, COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT AS LAND
PLANNING 1-2 (1984).
1I. The meaning of integration is a "universal question." Guruswamy, Integrating Thought-
ways: Re-Opening of the Environmental Mind?, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 463, 496 n.165. The term
"internal integration" should be understood as a sort of internal consistency within a given pro-
gram (in this case, CZMA). A program must be consistent internally before it can be integrated
with other environmental protection laws.
12. F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & D. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND
POLICY 846 (1984); see also W. ALLAYAUD, INTEGRATED PLANNING FOR WATER QUALITY MAN-
AGEMENT: THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972 AND COASTAL
ZONE MANAGEMENT 81-82 (1979) (noting inconsistencies within CZMA); Archer & Knecht,
supra note 6, at 117 (referring to the current "fragmented approach"); Wolf, Accommodating
Tensions in the Coastal Zone: An Introduction and Overview, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 7, 10 (1985)
("[Administrators] have often found themselves mired in a morass of territorial jealousy, confu-
sion, overburdening red tape, and frustrating litigation."). By contrast, the Toxic Substances Con-
1991]
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several times, and coastal zone management has been on a twenty-year march
toward internal integration. s As long as an individual statutory scheme is not
internally consistent and integrated, a completely integrated plan of environ-
mental protection is impossible. The study of this statute and its "micro-inte-
gration" problems should be of interest as one considers integration on a larger
scale."
This Article points out the problems associated with coordinating and inte-
grating a coastal environmental protection program and focuses on lessons that
can be applied to other matters as integrated environmental protection is pur-
sued. The Article begins with an outline and discussion of CZMA. It then
moves to problems of intergovernmental coordination and internal integration
that have been encountered under CZMA, including issues that affect deci-
sionmaking by various governmental units at the federal, state, and local
levels. The Article concludes by reviewing the lessons taught by the CZMA
experience as to the proper roles that must be played by different levels of
government, and suggesting that these lessons be adopted as the nation moves
toward a more fully integrated approach to environmental protection. The only
approach capable of truly protecting the environmental health of the nation is
a fully integrated environmental program that is cognizant of special matters
of particular relevance to local areas, but which does not limit its focus to any
specific geographical area or any specific type of environmental concern. The
first step toward that end is the internal integration of various environmental
acts, such as CZMA.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE SCHEME OF CZMA
States have been managing coastal areas since this nation was formed."
The federal government's role in coastal protection dates back at least to 1829,
when Fort Moultri, in South Carolina, was threatened by erosion.1 Modern
federal coastal protection, however, traces back to the Marine Resources and
Development Act of 1966'1 and the establishment of the Commission on
Marine Science, Engineering and Resources, commonly known as the Stratton
Commission.' The Stratton Commission focused national attention on the
trol Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1988), has been identified as a well integrated act.
Guruswamy, supra note II, at 522-25.
13. See supra note 9 (listing the various amendments to CZMA); see also Pelham, Hyde &
Banks, Managing Florida's Growth: Toward an Integrated State, Regional, and Local Compre-
hensive Planning Process, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 515, 517 (1985) (noting that Florida has tried to
integrate coastal management since 1971).
14. For a very informative account of how the environmental movement began with an inte-
grated ideal, only to become fragmented along the way (and why it needs to be reintegrated), see
Guruswamy, supra note 11, at 476-92.
15. See Kinsey, CZM from the State Perspective: The New Jersey Experience, 25 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 73, 73 (1985).
16. 1988 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY 18TH & 19TH ANN. REP. 93.
17. Pub. L. No. 89-454, 80 Stat. 203 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1131 (1988)).
18. CENTER FOR OCEAN MANAGEMENT STUDIES, THE NEWEST FEDERALISM: A NEW FRAME-
[Vol. 40:981
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value of coastal resources and the dangers of unplanned development. The
need for a federal coastal protection program was established based on find-
ings that, by the early 1970s, over twenty-five percent of the nation's salt mar-
shes had been destroyed; population was becoming more concentrated in and
about coastal areas; the nation's commercial fishing industry was dependent on
coastal waters, estuaries, and marshlands for the growth and development of
sealife; increased commercial and recreational use of the coast was endanger-
ing aquatic life; and fragmented, uncoordinated state and local regulation was
exacerbating pressure caused by economic development.19 These findings led to
passage of CZMA, *0 which was "aimed at saving the waters of our coasts and
the land whose use has a direct, significant, and adverse impact upon that
water."'"
CZMA is primarily concerned with development in the coastal zone,2" but it
also deals with air, water, and land-based pollution. Many decisions concern-
ing water use are intricately bound up in decisions and outcomes regarding
land use. For this reason, effective coastal management requires an integrated
approach to environmental protection. The very term "coastal zone"23 implies
WORK FOR COASTAL ISSUES ix (T. Galloway ed. 1982) [hereinafter NEWEST FEDERALISM]; J.
KALO, COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW 327 (1990); see also COMMISSION ON MARINE SCIENCE, ENGI-
NEERING AND RESOURCES, OUR NATION AND THE SEA (1969) (the Stratton Commission's report).
19. SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, 94TH CONG.. 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED IN 1974 AND 1976, at 194-98 (Comm.
Print 1976) [hereinafter CZMA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. CZMA's legislative history expressly
notes the importance of the work done by the Stratton Commission. Id. at 1-2.
20. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1988).
21. CZMA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY. supra note 19, at 249 (remarks of South Carolina Senator
Ernest Hollings). The legislative history of CZMA indicates.that, "[tlhe key to more effective use
of the coastal zone in the future is introduction of management systems permitting conscious and
informed choices among the various alternatives. The aim of this legislation is to assist in this very
critical goal." Id. at 198. However, some early cases placed the development goal above coastal
protection. See Billings v. California Coastal Comm'n, 103 Cal. App. 3d 729, 163 Cal. Rptr. 288
(1980).
22. "Unlike 'pure' environmental or 'pure' energy development interest legislation, the CZMA's
chief focus is on the planning side, as suggested by the term 'management.'" Wolf, supra note 12,
at 9; see also D. BROWER & D. CAROL, supra note 10, at 13 (comparing CZMA to land use
planning law).
23. The Act defines coastal zones as "coastal waters . . . and the adjacent shorelands . . .
strongly influenced by each other." 16 U.S.C. § 1453(I) (1988); see also 15 C.F.R. § 923.30-.32
(1990) (describing the elements of coastal zone boundaries). The reach of the zone is defined as
follows:
The zone extends, in Great Lakes waters, to the international boundary between the
United States and Canada and, in other areas, seaward to the outer limit of state title
and ownership under the Submerged Lands Act (43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315). The zone
shall extend inland from the shorelands to the extent necessary to control shorelands,
the uses of which have a direct and significant impact on the coastal waters.
16 U.S.C. § 1453(l) (1988), as amended by CZMA 1990 Amendments, supra note 9, § 6204(a).
This definition leaves much discretion to the states to determine the jurisdiction of their own
CMP. Accordingly, various coastal states have interpreted the vague jurisdictional declarations of
CZMA differently. Consequently, individual state programs vary a great deal in scope. See F.
ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & D. TARLOCK, supra note 12, at 846 (noting how states have de-
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the need for integration of at least land and water programs."4 Coastal dam-
age comes not only from physical construction and development, but also from
water pollution that is carried to the coast,25 toxins that make their way to the
coast, offshore oil exploration (especially accidents), air pollution, greenhouse
gases, 26 river channelization and canals, and a wide variety of other
activities. 27
In drafting CZMA, Congress recognized the "special need to relate air,
land and water planning" in the effort to combat environmental problems in
the coastal zone.28 Because coastal protection requires consideration of pollu-
fined their coastal zones differently); Finnell, Intergovernmental Relationships in Coastal Land
Management, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 31, 43-44 (1985) (noting that the proper area to be regu-
lated will vary from urban areas to rural areas). In California, the inward reach of the zone varies
from under 1000 yards up to five miles. T. SCHOENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW: CASES,
READINGS AND TEXT 493 (1985).
24. See CZMA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY. supra note 19, at 198 ("Coastal zone management
must be considered in terms of the two distinct but related regimes of land and water."). Stan-
dards embodied in the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act are expressly made applicable
under CZMA. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(") (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 923.45 (1990).
25. Nonpoint source water pollution has been identified as a major problem for coastal areas.
CZMA 1990 Amendments, supra note 9, § 6202(a)(5) ("Nonpoint source pollution is increas-
ingly recognized as a significant factor in coastal water degradation."); Houck, supra note 2, at
375 ("Approximately 70 percent of all sediment, 90 percent of fecal and all other coliforms, 80
percent of nitrogen, and 50 percent of all phosphorous pollution comes from nonpoint sources.");
Morganthau, supra note 1, at 45-47 ("Nonpoint pollution is now a problem in virtually every bay
and estuary in the United States, and it is certain to get worse."). In 1990 Congress attempted to
deal with the nonpoint source pollution problem by establishing a Coastal Nonpoint Pollution
Control Program. CZMA 1990 Amendments, supra note 9, § 6217. This program provides fed-
eral funds and technical assistance and requires each state with an approved CMP to develop a
"Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Protection Program" and to implement coastal land use
management measures for controlling nonpoint source pollution within four years. Id. The new
state programs are to be coordinated with water quality plans developed under the Water Pollu-
tion Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1288, 1313, 1329, 1330 (1988), and CZMA. CZMA 1990
Amendments, supra note 9, § 6217.
This program will help, but it is designed to handle nonpoint source water pollution only from
coastal areas. The source of nonpoint water pollution that affects coastal areas is not limited to
these areas. Thus, this nonintegrated approach will not provide maximum protection to the coast.
26. See Rychlak, supra note 3, at 95-97 (discussing rising coastal waters due to the greenhouse
effect); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1451(l) (1988), as amended by CZMA 1990 Amendments, supra
note 9, §§ 6202(a)(7), 6203(a)(3) (recognizing the greenhouse effect as a potential problem and
requiring states to begin planning for it).
27. One of the primary problems in the coastal zones is increased inflow of nutrients, especially
phosphate and nitrogen, which leads to increased growth of algae and depletion of dissolved oxy-
gen in the water. See Morganthau, supra note 1, at 47 ("Curbing nutrient pollution is now a
primary focus of government and private efforts to save the Chesapeake."); Growing Harm Seen
to Key Fish Source, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1987, at 1, col. I (National ed.), reprinted in J. KALO,
supra note 18, at 7, 9.
28. W. ALLAYAUD, supra note 12, at 4; see also CZMA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 19,
at 198 ("Coastal zone management must be considered in terms of the two distinct but related
regimes of land and water."). As early as 1975, various federal agencies noted the need to coordi-
nate their efforts to protect the coast. W. ALLAYAUD, supra note 12, at 78-79 (citing the Joint
Letter of EPA and OCZM, Aug. 26, 1975). In fact, at the time CZMA was enacted, there was
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tion in the air, land, and water, CZMA, more than any other federal statute,
must focus on an integrated approach to total environmental protection, not
just traditional "coastal" issues. To accomplish this, the Act divides responsi-
bility for coastal protection among local, state, and federal governments. This
has been called "a 'layered cake' federalism, with non-overlapping responsibili-
ties between levels of government."" Because of differences in topography, soil
conditions, and hydrology, as well as local commerce and aesthetic needs, only
local governments can properly assess and decide certain issues, such as land
use and city planning. 0 Moreover, at least some observers believe that "state
and local governments are inherently more equitable and efficient in their dis-
tribution of public resources."8 1 However, state and federal involvement is
needed to muster the substantial resources necessary for matters such as re-
search into acid rain and global warming. 2 Therefore, CZMA proposes a joint
venture.
CZMA relies on agreements between coastal states and the federal govern-
ment and offers financial assistance to states that develop a Coastal Manage-
ment Plan ("CMP"). As the name implies, a CMP is a comprehensive plan
designed to protect coastal resources and prevent environmental degradation
within the state. States are not required to develop CMPs, but there are sub-
stantial incentives." CZMA provides for grants that pay states up to eighty
percent of the cost of developing a program and fifty percent of the cost of
administering a CMP.3 4 Moreover, once a state has developed an approved
plan, there is a "consistency" provision that requires any federal agency activ-
ity or any federally sponsored activity that affects the relevant area to be "con-
some consideration given as to whether coastal zone management legislation should be enacted
separately or as part of a comprehensive land use law. Id. at 37-38. While it may have been
necessary to separate the coastal zone out for special treatment to initiate programs in 1972, the
articles in this symposium indicate that movement toward integration is needed today. As recently
as 1990, Congress amended CZMA to try, among other things, to combat problems of internal
integration. See, e.g., CZMA 1990 Amendments, supra note 9, §§ 6203(b)(6), 6208 (amending
16 U.S.C. § 1452 so as to add a new subsection dealing with coordination and cooperation be-
tween state and federal agencies).
29. NEWEST FEDERALISM, supra note 18, at 1.
30. Id. at 44, 71; Finnell, supra note 23, at 54, 58; see also infra notes 121-60 and accompany-
ing text (providing a detailed outline of the responsibilities of each level of government).
31. Finnell, supra note 23, at 58 (quoting Thomas Kostos).
32. NEWEST FEDERALISM, supra note 18, at 7; Finnell, supra note 23, at 59 (noting that state
and local governments have been unwilling or unable to handle issues such as placement of critical
energy facilities and protection of wetlands); Pelham, Hyde & Banks, supra note 13, at 519 (not-
ing the inability of local governments' to implement planning programs without state money).
33. If states do not develop a CMP, there is no federal agency to step in and fill the gap. J.
KALO, supra note 18, at 327; compare Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§
1251-1387 (1988) (minimum federal water quality standards govern in the absence of state
standards).
34. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1454-1455 (1988), as amended by CZMA 1990 Amendments, supra note 9,
§§ 6205, 6206; 15 C.F.R. §§ 923.90-.100, 926.1-.7, 927.8 (1990). The 1990 amendments also
provide grants to encourage states with existing plans to continue to improve them. CZMA 1990
Amendments, supra note 9, § 6210(d) (revising 16 U.S.C. § 1456b (1988)).
1991]
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sistent to the maximum extent practicable" with the state's CMP.88 These in-
centives have convinced most states to develop their own CMP.38
In order to receive federal money, state CMPs must comply with CZMA
standards 7 and be approved by the Secretary of Commerce.38 Those standards
permit states to develop plans that differ greatly from one another, 9 but all
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (1988), as amended by CZMA 1990 Amendments, supra note 9, §
6208; see also infra notes 55-75 and accompanying text (discussing the federal consistency re-
quirement). At least one author has noted symbolism as another advantage to developing a state
plan. Kinsey, supra note 15, at 74.
36. D. BROWER & D. CAROL, supra note 10, at 14 (concluding that all eligible states have
participated to some degree); T. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 23, at 492 ("Almost all of the eligible
states had received program approval by 1980."); Archer & Knecht, supra note 6, at 107 (noting
that all but six coastal states have approved plans). The number of approved plans is subject to
fluctuation, because approval can be withdrawn. See 16 U.S.C. § 1458(d) (1988), as amended by
CZMA 1990 Amendments, supra note 9, § 6212. Additionally, the number of coastal states may
be confusing because that term includes states bordering on the Great Lakes as well as United
States territories. Id. § 1453(4); 15 C.F.R. § 923.2(0 (1990).
37. Those standards require the CMP to establish specific boundaries for the coastal zone, de-
fine permissible land and water uses, identify areas of particular concern, identify a means to
control land and water uses, establish guidelines for priority of uses in certain areas, describe the
organization that will manage the program, and contain a planning process to address problems
such as beach access and protection, energy siting, and coastal erosion. The planning process must
include an organizational structure for decisionmaking, including opportunities for the involve-
ment of a wide variety of interest groups. 1.6 U.S.C. § 1455 (1988), as amended by CZMA 1990
Amendments, supra note 9, § 6206; 15 C.F.R. § 923.1-.105 (1990). States can also single out
important areas, such as the San Francisco Bay, for special treatment. See 15 C.F.R. § 923.30
(1990). See generally Chasis, The Coastal Zone Management Act: A Protective Mandate, 25
NAT. RESOURCES J. 21, 26 (1985) (providing a discussion of the objectives and requirements of
the CZMA); Note, Shifting Sands-A Comparison of English and American Coastal Zone Man-
agement Programs, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 495, 501 (1989) (same).
38. Responsibility for administering CZMA is assigned to the Secretary of Commerce, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1453(16), 1454(a), 1455(a), 1456(a) (1988), as amended by CZMA 1990 Amend-
ments, supra note 9, §§ 6205, 6206, 6208. The Secretary of Commerce designated the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA") as the agency to administer and interpret
CZMA. 15 C.F.R. § 923.2(b) (1990). There has been some criticism of the federal approval
process of state plans. See, e.g., O'Connell, Florida's Struggle for Approval Under the Coastal
Zone Management Act, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 61, 65 (1985) (calling federal approval a "moving
target"); Wolf, supra note 12, at 10. The General Accounting Office ("GAO") has also been
highly critical of the implementation efforts. The GAO found that federal regulations were contin-
ually shifting and often confusing and that federal program evaluations often were unreliable and
were not based on adequate evaluation criteria. F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & D. TARLOCK,
supra note 12, at 860 (citing U.S. General Accounting Office, Problems Continue in the Federal
Management of the Coastal Zone Management Program (1980)); see also Archer & Knecht,
supra note 6, at 113-14 (suggesting ways to improve federal evaluations of state programs). An
interesting question and answer format discussing the requirements for federal approval, prior to
the 1990 amendments, is set forth in Kinsey, supra note 15, at 79-83.
39. See Hildreth & Johnson, CZM in California, Oregon, and Washington, 25 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 103, 112 (1985) (discussing plans for the states of California, Oregon, and Washing-
ton and a local plan for San Francisco); see also Owens, Land Acquisition and Coastal Resource
Management: A Pragmatic Perspective, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 625, 645-50 (1983) (discussing
North Carolina's plan); Pelham, Regulating Areas of Critical State Concern: Florida and the
Model Code, 18 URB. L. ANN. 3 (1980) (questioning the viability of Florida's plan); Pelham,
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states are required to consider the national interest as well as "local, areawide,
and interstate plans" affected by the program.'0 The purpose of this considera-
tion is to achieve the Act's "spirit of equitable balance between State and
national interests."" In commenting upon the requirements for state consider-
ation of federal concerns, the Committee Report that accompanied the legisla-
tion states:
This new policy underscores the importance for states to consult and coordi-
nate with, and give adequate consideration to the federal agencies in the
implementation of their management programs. States are encouraged to
provide federal agencies with the opportunity to participate and consider
federal agency views. This does not, however, imply that a state must com-
ply with these views."
Thus, states must consider federal interests as they draft their CMPs. The
federal government must consider state and local concerns as activities are
undertaken or approved, as mandated by the consistency requirement of
CZMA."' Thus, CZMA clearly contemplates the need for integration and co-
ordination between various governmental entities.4
After the state has promulgated its CMP, the federal government delegates
most enforcement authority to the state, though the federal government does
review performance and may withhold federal funds and withdraw federal ap-
proval if the state fails to meet national standards." Once in place, most
Hyde & Banks, supra note 13 (discussing Florida's plan); Schell, Living with the Legacy of the
1970's: Federal/State Coordination in the Coastal Zone, 14 ENVTL. L. 751, 765-73 (1984) (dis-
cussing Oregon's plan).
40. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1455(d)(3)(A), 1455(d)(8) (1988), as amended by CZMA 1990 Amend-
ments, supra note 9, § 6206; 15 C.F.R. §§ 923.51-.52(c), 930.122 (1990). However, it may be
that "the truth of the matter is, nobody knows what the concept of 'national interest' means as it
is used [under CZMA]." D. BROWER & D. CAROL, supra note 10, at 14 (quoting Dr. Evelyn
Murphy).
41. American Petroleum Inst. v. Knecht, 456 F. Supp. 889, 924 (C.D. Cal. 1978), afid, 609
F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1979).
42. H.R. REP. No. 1012, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 4362, 4388.
43. See infra notes 55-75 and accompanying text.
44. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451(i), 1452(2)(I), 1452(4), 1452(5), 1456(a) (1988), as amended by
CZMA 1990 Amendments, supra note 9, § 6203; 15 C.F.R. § 923.50 (1990); see also Schell,
supra note 39, at 752 ("[Tlhere is a need, as never before, for more efficient and effective govern-
ment-government that does not duplicate or delay.").
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1458(d) (1988), as amended by CZMA 1990 Amendments, supra note 9, §
6211 (c); 15 C.F.R. §§ 923.41(b), 928.1-.5 (1990). The federal government provides funds to sup-
port states as they operate their CMPs and may assess sanctions, in limited circumstances, where
states have failed to comply with CZMA requirements. Federal officials are authorized to with-
draw approval of and financial assistance from any state that has failed to take the actions re-
quired under CZMA. 16 U.S.C. § 1458(d) (1988), as amended by CZMA 1990 Amendments,
supra note 9, § 6212(c). These penalties were the only relevant sanctions for noncompliance by
the state with CZMA prior to the 1990 amendments. See Save Our Dunes v. Pegues, 642 F.
Supp. 393, 401 (M.D. Ala. 1985). Prior to the 1990 amendments, Congress had expressly "con-
sidered and rejected several different proposals for penalties and sanctions for noncompliance,"
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CMPs rely on a permit system to control development on the coast." Anyone
who proposes any significant activity or development must obtain the requisite
permits, often from several different agencies, at several different levels of gov-
ernment.4 These permits are supposed to assure that the proposal will not
cause environmental harm beyond that permitted under the state CMP.'8
Only after each permit has been obtained and each requirement has been met
may the proposed activity proceed.
II. DECISIONMAKING PROBLEMS UNDER CZMA
Although CZMA has been called "a success,""9 the effectiveness of the Act
in protecting coastal resources is difficult to measure.50 There are few studies
and concluded that "[u]ntil experience dictates the need for greater sanctions than termination of
financial assistance, . . . this sanction will suffice." Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 14-15, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4776, 4789). Apparently expe-
rience did dictate otherwise, because Congress recently modified CZMA so as to allow interim
sanctions (for not more than three years) to supplement final (permanent) sanctions. CZMA 1990
Amendments, supra note 9, § 6212(b) (amending 16 U.S.C. § 1458(c) (1988)). Perhaps a less
draconian sanction will motivate states that do not seriously think that their CMP risks losing
approval.
46. See 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (1988), as amended by CZMA 1990 Amendments, supra
note 9, § 6208(b)(2). However, the permit concept has some built-in problems that make it less
than ideal for protecting the coast. For instance, once a person has received a permit to conduct
certain activity, there typically is no incentive to reduce pollution further. Guruswamy, supra note
II, at 502. The 1990 amendments to CZMA have attempted to deal with this problem by estab-
lishing a Coastal Zone Enhancement Grants Program that is designed to encourage states to con-
tinually improve their CMPs in one or more of eight identified areas: coastal wetlands manage-
ment and protection, natural hazards management (including potential sea and Great Lake level
rise), public access improvements, reduction of marine debris, assessment of cumulative and sec-
ondary impacts of coastal growth and development, special area management planning, ocean
resource planning, and siting of coastal energy and governmental facilities. CZMA 1990 Amend-
ments, supra note 9, § 6210(a) (amending 16 U.S.C. § 1456b (1988)).
47. Because CMPs vary from state to state, it is impossible to identify one procedure that is
applicable in every situation.
48. Federal agencies generally are not permitted to issue a permit unless the activity is consis-
tent with the relevant state's CMP. See infra notes 55-75 and accompanying text.
49. F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & D. TARLOCK, supra note 12, at 845; see also W. AL-
LAYAUD, supra note 12, at 41 (calling early results under CZMA "very encouraging"); F. ANDER-
SON, D. MANDELKER & D. TARLOCK, supra note 12, at 860 (concluding that the "primary
achievement" of CZMA may be in better coordination of existing coastal programs); Archer &
Knecht, supra note 6, at 107 (calling CZMA "successful"); Morganthau, supra note I, at 44
(noting that "the quality of many coastal and inland waterways-notably the Great Lakes-has
improved substantially").
50. Archer & Knecht, supra note 6, at 107; Note, supra note 37, at 502. Not all early reviews
of CZMA procedures were favorable.
The message is as clear as it is repugnant: under our so-called federal system, the
Congress is constitutionally empowered to launch programs the scope, impact, conse-
quences and workability of which are largely unknown, at least to the Congress, at
the time of enactment; the federal bureaucracy is legally permitted to execute the
congressional mandate with a high degree of befuddlement as long as it acts no more
befuddled than the Congress must reasonably have anticipated; if ultimate execution
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attempting to figure the impact of CZMA,51 but even with more data, it would
be hard to isolate activities that would have taken place but for CZMA, or to
determine whether mitigation-type activities would have taken place even
without the Act.52 Moreover, because of the large part played by the state and
local government, "success" in one geographic area would not necessarily indi-
cate success in another. Nevertheless, it is probably fair to say that CZMA
has slowed the rate of environmental damage that was being done to coastal
areas,5" but CZMA has not been able to completely curtail the degradation.
Assuming that current trends prevail, there will be more demand for coastal
development well into the future."' Unless coastal protection programs im-
prove, the environmental degradation will continue. Three areas, in particular,
are of great concern as one views CZMA's experiment with integration: the
federal "consistency" requirement, coordination between various governmental
agencies, and compensation for regulations that are found to constitute
takings.
A. The Federal Consistency Requirement
CZMA's federal "consistency" requirement has proved to be one of its most
controversial provisions. 5 Once states have an approved CMP, federal pro-
grams (and projects that require federal permits) must be "consistent to the
maximum extent practicable" with the state CMP.5 This requirement is
of the congressional mandate requires interaction between federal and state bureau-
cracy, the resultant maze is one of the prices required under the system.
American Petroleum Inst. v. Knecht, 456 F. Supp. 889, 931 (C.D. Cal. 1978), affid, 609 F.2d
1306 (9th Cir. 1979). "In other words, for the high purpose of improving and maintaining felici-
tous conditions in the coastal areas of the United States, the Congress has undertaken a legislative
solution, the application of which is so complex as to make it almost wholly unmanageable." Id. at
896; see also Archer & Knecht, supra note 6, at 104 (calling CZMA "increasingly ineffective and
lacking in direction" since 1982); Houck, supra note 2, at 404 ("Either we act more forcefully to
save America's most important ecosystem, or we should stop spending the money and effort on
halfway measures that simply forestall the inevitable, in the fashion of cut flowers.").
51. Archer & Knecht, supra note 6, at 107; Note, supra note 37, at 502.
52. Kinsey, supra note 15, at 79.
53. Perhaps the lack of coordination in the permitting process, see infra notes 76-103 and ac-
companying text, has been a blessing in disguise in that the difficulties in obtaining permits
delayed or even prevented some potentially destructive projects.
54. See CZMA 1990 Amendments, supra note 9, § 6202(a)(1) ("Growing human pressure on
the coastal ecosystem will continue to degrade this resource. ... ); Congressional Research Ser-
vice, Major Legislation of the Congress MLC-104 (Summary Issue, 101st Cong., Dec. 1990)
(noting "[i]ncreasing population concentration near the coasts ... [and] increasing coastal use").
55. F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & D. TARLOCK, supra note 12, at 857 (CZMA's consistency
requirement has proved "controversial"); Archer & Knecht, supra note 6, at 106 (same).
56. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (1988), as amended by CZMA 1990 Amendments, supra note 9, §
6208; 15 C.F.R. § 930.1-.145 (1990); see Cape May Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179, 192
(3d Cir. 1983) (holding that the Environmental Protection Agency's decision was arbitrary where
the Agency refused to abide by the state determination that the federal action was not consistent
with the state CMP). Some commentators have criticized this aspect of CZMA as inviting delay,
litigation, and inefficiency. Kuersteiner & Sullivan, Coastal Federalism: The Role of the Federal
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designed to achieve better coordination between federal and state agencies. 57
Federal agencies may not approve proposed projects that are inconsistent with
a CMP, except on a finding by the Secretary of Commerce that the program
is consistent with the purposes of CZMA or necessary in the interest of na-
tional security.58 Under CZMA:
(a) The term "consistent to the maximum extent practicable" describes the
requirement for Federal activities including development projects directly
affecting the coastal zone of States with approved management programs to
be fully consistent with such programs unless compliance is prohibited based
upon the requirements of existing law applicable to the Federal agency's
operations. If a Federal agency asserts that compliance with the manage-
ment program is prohibited, it must clearly describe to the State agency the
statutory provisions, legislative history, or other legal authority which limits
the Federal agency's discretion to comply with the provisions of the manage-
ment program.59
Thus, CZMA promises states veto power over nondiscretionary federal
projects that are inconsistent with their CMP. However, "[c]onflict, rather
than cooperation" seems to have been the result of the consistency
requirement. 60
Although CZMA's "'intent ... is to enhance state authority,' not 'diminish'
Supremacy Doctrine in Federal and State Conflict Resolution, 33 JAG J. 39, 39-41 (1984); see
also 15 C.F.R. § 930.39(d) (1990) (permitting the federal government to enforce its regulations
when they are more strict than the state's regulations); Archer & Knecht, supra note 6, at 120
n.48 (discussing a rule proposed by the Army Corps of Engineers that would allow federal pre-
emption of the consistency requirements in the case of ocean disposal activities).
57. Kanouse, Achieving Federalism in the Regulation of Coastal Energy Facility Siting, 8
ECOLOGY L.Q. 533, 550 (1980) (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1544, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 14
(1972)).
58. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B)(iii) (1988). This consistency requirement, however, is not the
equivalent of subordination to state management programs, such as that mandated by the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988). That Act, like several
others that affect environmental protection, explicitly waives both sovereign immunity and federal
supremacy with respect to federal agency activities and places federal agencies under state envi-
ronmental control authority to the same extent as any "non-governmental entity." 33 U.S.C. §
1323(a) (1988). Under CZMA, state regulation is not preempted, except in the case of actual
conflict between federal and state law. California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S.
572, 581 (1987).
59. 15 C.F.R. § 930.32(a) (1990). The Supreme Court has expressly avoided construing the
term "to the maximum extent practicable." Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312,
320 n.5 (1984).
60. Comment, The Seaweed Rebellion Revisited: Continuing Federal-State Conflict in OCS
Oil and Gas Leasing, 20 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 83, 91 (1984). Conflicts have also arisen between
state and local governmental units. See infra notes 122-29 and accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of the state's ability to condition a finding of consistency on mitigation measures being under-
taken, see Archer & Bondareff, Implementation of the Federal Consistency Doctrine-Lawful
and Constitutional: A Response to Whitney, Johnson & Perles, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 115,
127-36 (1988).
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it,"" the federal consistency provision gives states less authority over federal
actions than they originally had been promised.6 2 A state's authority to protect
its environment comes from its police powers, which are subject only to state
and federal constitutional limitations. Thus, even without CZMA, the state
has great powers in terms of coastal protection." CZMA may not add much
to those powers. For instance, federal activities are not subject to the consis-
tency requirement if the national interest outweighs the state's concerns.6 4
Moreover, the consistency requirement does not apply unless the state already
has an applicable, enforceable policy in place." Even if such a state policy
does exist, it is unclear what additional power the state obtains that it would
not otherwise possess under its police powers. 6
The value of federal consistency has been further diluted by federal agen-
cies' refusal to cooperate with the states.67 The issue came to a head in Secre-
tary of the Interior v. California." In that case, despite a Department of Jus-
tice opinion to the contrary," the Interior Department argued that its prelease
61. Save Our Dunes v. Pegues, 642 F. Supp. 393, 401 (M.D. Ala. 1985) (quoting S. REP. No.
753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4776, 4776); D.
BROWER & D. CAROL, supra note 10, at 37 (quoting the same language).
62. Chasis, supra note 37, at 29; see also Finnell, supra note 23, at 58-59 ("The ultimate
question for state and local governments is not whether they can retain most of their regulatory
authority in the coastal zone. Rather it is whether they can keep any at all.").
63. For a general discussion of state power to protect the coast in the absence of CZMA, see
Marcel & Bockrath, Regional Governments and Coastal Zone Management in Louisiana, 40 LA.
L. REV. 887, 891-96 (1980).
64. If a federal court has determined that federal activity is not consistent with a state's CMP,
"the President may, upon written request from the Secretary, exempt from compliance those ele-
ments of the Federal agency activity . . . if the President determines that the activity is in the
paramount interest of the United States." 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(B) (1988), as amended by
CZMA 1990 Amendments, supra note 9, § 6208(a).
65. See 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(A) (1988), as amended by CZMA 1990 Amendments, supra
note 9, § 6208(a) ("Each Federal agency activity . . . shall be carried out in a manner which is
consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the enforceable policies of approved state man-
agement programs" (emphasis added)); see also Quinones Lopez v. Coco Lagoon Dev. Corp., 562
F. Supp. 188 (D.P.R. 1983) (upholding the Army Corps of Engineers' activity where a state had
no existing procedure).
66. Chasis, supra note 37, at 29; see also Archer & Knecht, supra note 6, at 106 (stating "the
federal consistency doctrine allows national interests to prevail over state interests"). Prior to the
CZMA 1990 Amendments, federal activities that occurred outside of the coastal zone were not
subject to the consistency requirement unless their effects spilled over and "significantly" affected
the coastal-zone. 15 C.F.R. § 923.33(c)(1) (1990). This test has been substantially changed by the
1990 amendments, so that the consistency requirement now applies to any federal activity that
affects the coastal zone. CZMA 1990 Amendments, supra note 9, § 6208(a) (amending 16 U.S.C.
§ 1456(c)(1)).
67. Mediation procedures are provided for serious disagreements between coastal states and
federal agencies. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(h) (1988); 15 C.F.R. §§ 923.54, 930.1 10-.116 (1990). A party
can resort to the judicial process, however, without having first exhausted mediation procedures.
15 C.F.R. § 930.116 (1990).
68. 464 U.S. 312 (1984). For a more detailed account of the agency maneuvering and political
backdrop leading up to this decision, see Comment, supra note 60, at 112-40.
69. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,142 (1979).
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sales activities on the Outer Continental Shelf ("OCS") were not reviewable
for consistency with the California CMP. 7° The Supreme Court agreed with
the Interior Department and held that the sale of oil and gas leased on the
OCS did not "directly affect" the coastal zone.7 1 Although environmentalists
were outraged at the decision, and there were immediate calls for congres-
sional action,7 2 other federalagencies viewed this case as controlling precedent
in the development of their regulations.73 The ruling remained in force until
Congress overruled it in CZMA Amendments of 1990.74 With this back-
ground, it is not surprising that states have a basic distrust of the federal gov-
ernment's willingness to comply with the consistency provisions of CZMA.7 5
B. Problems of Redundancy and Conflicting Requirements
An integrated environmental protection program requires that authority be
divided among various levels of government so that local matters can be ade-
quately addressed and national resources can be tapped. 6 The intended ad-
vantages of an integrated program with divided authority include: avoiding
duplication of effort (each local government need not "re-invent the wheel");
assuring that the requisite expertise is available (experts might not be availa-
ble for each locality, but the federal government can hire one set of experts);
assurance of financial resources (each local government need only contribute a
fair share, not shoulder the whole burden); and due consideration of matters of
local, state, and regional importance.7 7 The disadvantages of an integrated
70. Secretary of the Interior, 464 U.S. at 318-19.
71. Id. at 315. Justice O'Connor, author of the majority opinion, based her decision on legisla-
tive history and the statutory framework governing OCS activities. She concluded that the phrase
"directly affecting" was intended to reach activities on the federal lands within the coastal zone
but not OCS lands outside the coastal zone. Id. at 330. The statutory test was substantially modi-
fied by the 1990 amendments, so that the consistency requirement now applies to any federal
activity that affects the coastal zone, not just to those that directly or significantly affect it.
CZMA 1990 Amendments, supra note 9, § 6208(a) (amending 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)).
72. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 60, at 140 ("Congress needs to restore the federal consis-
tency authority of coastal states.")
73. See Howorth, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Ocean Dredging Policy and Its Relationship
with the Coastal Zone Management Act, (in press) (1990) (both the Army Corps of Engineers
and the EPA have taken the position that consistency is not required when the federal activity
takes place outside of the coastal zone).
74. CZMA 1990 Amendments, supra note 9, § 6208(a) (amending 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)).
CZMA provided special treatment for OCS development even before the 1990 amendments. See
16 U.S.C. § 1456a (1988), as amended by CZMA 1990 Amendments, supra note 9, § 6209; 15
C.F.R. § 930.70-.86 (1990).
75. See Archer & Knecht, supra note 6, at 108 (concluding that "conflicts between the federal
office and the coastal states over the review of both major and minor program changes have cre-
ated a climate of uncertainty in the state programs and considerable distrust between federal and
state officials"); see also Schell, supra note 39, at 774 (arguing that the federal government
should be forced to comply with CMPs).
76. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
77. See Kanouse, supra note 57, at 556 ("Allowing each state to develop its coastal manage-
ment program independently of federal agencies would result in thirty sub-national energy policies
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program with divided authority include the following risks: inconsistent obliga-
tions and requirements; duplication among various levels of governments; less
public participation; and increased costs (as opposed to having one level of
government handle the entire project).78
The problem with providing roles for several different governmental units is
that each tends to develop tunnel vision, acting independently of the others.
The state of Alabama recently undertook a study to determine how coastal
environmental programs were working in that state. The conclusions reached
by the study were that
the existing coastal program has not been able to deal effectively with devel-
opment problems facing the area. It does nothing to facilitate appropriate
growth while protecting important natural resources. Additionally, because
the responsibility of resource management is split among various agencies,
resolution of conflicts becomes time consuming and complicated ...
[T]he Alabama Environmental Protection Plan has proposed that Alabama
establish a comprehensive evaluation and protection strategy in order to
identify both existing and potential problems.7 9
Looking at coastal protection on a larger scale, the Conservation Foundation
found that national and state roles in the program were not clearly defined and
that federal control was limited.8 0 The report noted a tension between achiev-
ing substantive results in coastal protection and improving management and
institutional capabilities at the state level.8 1 Similar problems, which affect the
decisionmaking capabilities of governmental agencies, are prevalent in several
state plans.82
The difficulty of implementing an integrated system lies in trying to maxi-
mize the advantages and minimize the disadvantages of divided authority. 3 If
competing in part and overlapping in part with national energy policy.").
78. NEWEST FEDERALISM, supra note 18, at 7-8,.21, 42-43, 72-73; Hildreth & Johnson, supra
note 39, at 112.
79. O'Dell & Howorth, supra note 1, at 379 n.94 (emphasis added).
80. F. ANDERSON. D. MANDELKER & D. TARLOCK, supra note 12, at 860 (citing CONSERVA-
TION FOUNDATION. COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT 1980-A CONTEXT FOR DEBATE (1980)). A
limited federal role, of course, is at the heart of CZMA's "'new federalism." See generally NEW-
EST FEDERALISM, supra note 18 (a symposium focusing on the role of federal, state, and local
government in coastal zone management).
81. F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & D. TARLOCK. supra note 12, at 860 (citing CONSERVA-
TION FOUNDATION, COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT 1980-A CONTEXT FOR DEBATE (1980)). One
court put it more bluntly, referring to CZMA as a:
morass of problems between the private sector, the public sector, the federal bureau-
cracy, the state legislature, the state bureaucracy, and all of the administrative agen-
cies appurtenant thereto. Because the action taken gives rise to claims public and
private which must be adjudicated, this matter is now involved in the judicial process.
American Petroleum Inst. v. Knecht, 456 F. Supp. 889, 896 (C.D. Cal. 1978), aft'd, 609 F.2d
1306 (9th Cir. 1979).
82. See, e.g., Hildreth & Johnson, supra note 39, at 112 (discussing three state plans).
83. This is not easy to do. See Schell, supra note 39, at 752 ("Coordination requires consis-
tency, accommodation of both public and private interests, predictability, simplicity, and speed.").
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each level of government imposes its own requirements, without due regard for
the other levels of government, conflicting and redundant requirements are
likely to result and the entire process can become unworkable. Permit seekers
may find, and taxpayers may pay for, inconsistent or redundant require-
ments. 8 Connecticut's Director of Environmental Planning told this story:
There was a man who wanted to build a floating restaurant and found he
needed 13 permits-local, state and federal (there is no county government
in Connecticut). When this gentleman embarked on the permit process, he
found out it was a sort of vicious circle. When he got permit number 11,
number eight had expired. Now, this gentleman died before he ever got all
his permits. . . . If you are going to cut budgets and transfer responsibili-
ties, where does it leave the poor ghost of this gentleman and the floating
restaurant?88
As inconvenient as this process may be to permit seekers, developers often
have the resources to muddle their way through, or the clout to successfully
obtain their permits. A more serious problem may be the impact that conflict-
ing regulations have on coastal protection. Conflicting and redundant require-
ments can create disharmony between the different governmental units and
agencies that are charged with protecting the environment, leading to less uni-
formity, less integration, "turf wars" between agencies, and ultimately less
protection for the coastal environment."
84. See California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 593 (1987) (holding
that compliance with federal regulation did not immunize a mining company from state regulation
over activity to be conducted on federal land). The problem is especially acute with regard to
siting of industrial facilities.
Major new industrial facilities face a bewildering array of siting requirements on the
local, state and federal levels of government. Applicable regulatory laws vary depend-
ing on the type of facility, the jurisdiction, and the site chosen, but they include air
and water pollution requirements, NEPA and state environmental policy counter-
parts, as well as state and local land use and development permits.
T. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 23, at 511; see also 33 C.F.R. § 320.3 (1990) (identifying federal
laws related to CZMA).
85. NEWEST FEDERALISM, supra note 18, at 78; see also 1986 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY
17TH ANN. REP. 90 (discussing permitting problems under wetlands protection legislation).
86. J. KALO, supra note 18, at 274 (noting the "occasional interagency warfare" between the
EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers); Wolf, supra note 12, at 10 (noting that "intragovern-
mental disputes, often based on envy and mistrust, have made the road to efficient coastal man-
agement a rocky one in several instances"); id. at 12 (noting "friction among different branches of
the same level of government" (emphasis in original)). The EPA has, on at least one occasion,
used its power to veto a permit issued by the Army Corps of Engineers. 53 Fed. Reg. 16,469
(1988). The permit had been issued after-the-fact, as permitted by 33 C.F.R. § 326.3(e) (1990).
Often, however, the EPA can accomplish its objectives merely by threatening a veto. See, e.g., 21
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1622 (Jan. 4, 1991) (Florida developers agreed to preserve mangrove swamps
around Biscayne Bay in face of threatened veto). The Army Corps of Engineers' difficulty with
the EPA may be explained because, due to its civil works program, the Army Corps of Engineers
"historically was viewed as a major contributor to environmental degradation and destruction." J.
KALO, supra note 18, at 167; see also Archer & Knecht, supra note 6, at 120 n.48 (discussing a
rule proposed by the Army Corps of Engineers that would allow federal preemption of the consis-
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A fragmented and piecemeal approach to environmental protection simply
cannot provide the type of protection fragile ecosystems, like those along the
coast, need. Instead, there must be a well-coordinated plan, providing inte-
grated protection. Professor Houck of Tulane explained the problem with the
current lack of integration:
There is no identifiable decision to develop the coast. The development is
cumulative and case-by-case. And this is exactly where the regulatory pro-
grams fail. Each proposal seems so reasonable. How can a proposed develop-
ment plan be denied on the grounds of what has already been done, by en-
tirely different parties, some time before? Even more problematic, how can
it be denied on the basis of what others will do, or may do, in the future?8"
Thus, effective environmental legislation requires not only participation at va-
rious levels of government, it also requires planning, coordination, and integra-
tion of the requirements among those levels.
Integrated environmental protection requires advance planning, as opposed
to ad hoc decisions. This is needed not simply to make the permitting process
easier for applicants, but to provide adequate environmental protection. Per-
mits should not be handed out simply because a prior applicant received one.
One dock on a small bay probably has no serious adverse impact. Does the
second? The tenth? The twenty-fifth? Yet, without a plan, there is no more
reason to deny the last applicant than there was to deny the first. The perils of
uncoordinated and unplanned development in coastal areas have been well
documented.88 Advance planning, however, requires coordination between the
tency requirements in certain cases); Houck, supra note 2, at 362 (referring to the "construction-
minded Corps"). Similar problems exist between state and local governmental units. D. BROWER
& D. CAROL, supra note 10, at 14; Marcel & Bockrath, supra note 63, at 887-88.
87. Houck, supra note 2, at 361. Similar to various other federal regulations, such as the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4347 (1988) ("NEPA"), and the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988), CZMA requires consideration of cumulative effects.
15 C.F.R. § 923.11(c)(2) (1990). This consideration is normally limited to directly related and
nearly imminent actions. Houck, supra note 2, at 361 n.15 (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S.
390, 408-15 (1987)). Consideration of these impacts may be further limited by analyzing only the
effects of the activity permitted, such as construction of a pier, instead of the associated develop-
ment, such as operation of a manufacturing plant. Id. (citing Baldwin, EPA Refers Proposed
Corps NEPA Procedures to CEQ, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., May-June 1985, at 3, 4). Once
consideration is reduced to such a minimal level, permit approval is almost certain. Id.; cf. City of
Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that, under NEPA, consideration of
environmental impact may not be limited to construction of an intersection, but must include
"inevitable industrial development").
88. One commentator has described the decline of the wetlands as follows:
[U]nplanned and uncoordinated development in coastal regions during the past forty
years has jeopardized the "fragile and complex systems of estuaries, lagoons, beaches,
bays, harbors, islands and wetlands that are habitats for thousands of varieties of
birds, fish, shellfish, reptiles, and mammals." An estimated forty-percent of our na-
tions's wetlands have been damaged or destroyed in our haste to develop these areas
and they continue to be damaged at a rate of 300,000 acres per year.
Comment, supra note 60, at 87 (footnotes omitted). It is now estimated that 50% of the nation's
wetlands have been destroyed. CZMA 1990 Amendments, supra note 9, § 6202(a)(4); Morgan-
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various permitting agencies at different levels of government. 9
Several attempts have been made to better integrate and coordinate differ-
ent requirements under CZMA.90 Unfortunately, it is not an easy matter.91
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") made a "striking move" to-
wards permit integration in the early 1980s, when it adopted consolidated per-
mit regulations, which were hoped to synthesize separate permit systems and
provide a more comprehensive environmental evaluation of industrial
projects.92 The regulations were aimed at governing the hazardous waste man-
agement program under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,93 the
Underground Injection Control program of the Safe Drinking Water Act,9"
portions of the Clean Water Act,9 and portions of the Clean Air Act.96 The
purpose of the regulations was to integrate the permitting process.97 Industry
groups opposed the regulations, claiming that they imposed additional burdens
on industry. 8 After a very short life, the regulations were "de-consolidated"
(essentially repealed). 99
Although the EPA attempted to do what must eventually be done, it may be
that the agency tried to do too much too soon. A macro-integration problem
thau, supra note I, at 46; see also Sumi & Hanayama, Existing Institutional Arrangements and
Implications for Management of Tokyo Bay, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 167 (1985) (discussing
problems encountered due to lack of planning in the development of Tokyo Bay).
89. The "key to the marked success, even survival," of CZMA is coordination of needs and
requirements among the various levels and branches of government. Wolf, supra note 12, at 12;
see also W. ALLAYAUD, supra note 12, at 204 (recommending integrated water and land plan-
ning); R. BAILEY, The Wet Side of Coastal Zone Management in Oregon, in COASTAL ZONE '87:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH SYMPOSIUM ON COASTAL AND OCEAN MANAGEMENT 5248, 5257
(1987) (noting the "need for interagency coordination in the management of ocean resources");
Guruswamy, supra note 11, at 516-18 (recommending an integrated approach to environmental
protection).
90. In fact, certain regulations specifically deal with this issue, but they are limited in scope
and set forth proposals in the form of suggestions rather than requirements. See 15 C.F.R. §
923.13 (1990) (dealing with energy facility siting).
91. As Richard Brooks explained:
I am reminded of having appeared before the U.S. House Merchant Marine and Fish-
eries Committee and being asked the question, "Well, you environmentalists, you
want to strengthen the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), tell us what the
proper balance is between federal, state, and local government in this area;" and as I
recall, about that time, I figuratively, if not literally, crawled under the table since I
did not have an answer!
NEWEST FEDERALISM. supra note 18, at 20-21.
92. See 45 Fed. Reg. 33,290 (1980).
93. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i (1988).
94. Id. §§ 300f-300j.
95. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
96. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988).
97. The most important environmental benefit was identified as "more comprehensive manage-
ment and control of wastes." 45 Fed. Reg. 33,291 (1980).
98. Guruswamy, supra note 11, at 532.
99. Id. (citing President's Task Force on Regulatory Relief, 13 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2205
(1983)).
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involving five statutes is far more complex than a micro-integration problem
involving a single statutory scheme. If internal integration can be achieved
within a given statutory scheme, coordinating it with other statutes should be
less difficult. However, if statutes are not internally integrated, the very idea of
coordinating separate statutory schemes is unrealistic. The Toxic Substances
Control Act of 1976100 has been identified as a well-integrated Act,10' but
clearly CZMA is not yet fully coordinated. 10 2 Efforts to internally integrate
and coordinate the requirements of CZMA must continue, and regulators
must consider the mistakes and the successes of these efforts as they work
toward integration in other environmental protection schemes. 03
C. The Takings Issue
Effective environmental protection requires that decisions be based on envi-
ronmental concerns, not economic matters. However, governmental deci-
sionmakers may sometimes be influenced by budgetary limitations. If the gov-
ernment "takes" private property for public uses, the prior owner is entitled to
compensation.0 As early as 1921 the Supreme Court held that regulations
could be so intrusive as to constitute a taking.0 5 More recent Supreme Court
decisions have been called "ominous.' 0 6 Thus, decisionmakers might fear that
a court will consider regulation to constitute a taking and require that pay-
ment be made. That fear could certainly cause decisionmakers to be reluctant
100. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1988).
101. Guruswamy, supra note 1I, at 522-25.
102. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
103. Limited, integrated permitting programs are also a good initial step. Over twenty states
have enacted "one-stop" siting laws for thermal electric generating facilities. T. SCHOENBAUM,
supra note 23, at 511; see, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 80.50.010-.902 (1977). A few states have
enacted siting legislation for all large industrial developments. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-20-
102 (1989); WYO. STAT. § 35-12-102 (Supp. 1990); see also Graybill, Environmental Compatibil-
ity and Public Need: A Case Study of Montana's Major Facility Siting Act, I HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 458 (1976) (analyzing Montana's siting legislation); Van Vaalen, Industrial Siting Legisla-
tion: The Wyoming Industrial Development Information and Siting Act-Advance or Retreat, 11
LAND & WATER L. REV. 27 (1976) (analyzing Wyoming's siting legislation). Siting laws have
received some favorable reviews. See, e.g., Murray & Seneker, Industrial Siting: Allocating the
Burden of Pollution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 302-03 (1978) ("[Siting legislation] has achieved
laudable progress in conserving the environment .... "). However, they are also controversial
and have been the subject of litigation. T. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 23, at 512 (citing In re Maine
Clean Fuels, Inc., 310 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973)).
104. U.S. CONST. amend V; see Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127
(1978) ("[A] use restriction on real property may constitute a 'taking'...."); 33 U.S.C. § 595a
(1988) (compensation for the taking of real property above the high water mark by the United
States shall include the fair market value based upon all reasonable uses to which the property
may be put).
105. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1921) (holding that "while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking").
106. Houck, supra note 2, at 364; see also Kaiser-Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174-
75 (1979) (discussing the Court's inability to develop a set formula as to when compensation is
required).
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to impose strict regulations.
In 1985, while reaffirming broad federal jurisdiction under section 404 of
the Clean Water Act, the Supreme Court raised and reserved the question of
whether the regulation at issue constituted a taking.1"7 In 1987, while again
reserving the takings claim, the Court declared that local governments would
be liable in money damages for temporary regulations that are subsequently
adjudicated to be takings. 10 8 In its most recent proclamation, Nollan v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission,1 0 the Supreme Court declared that coastal use
mitigation requirements, which required landowners to provide public access
in return for permission to tear down and rebuild a dilapidated house located
on beachfront property, constituted impermissible takings of private property,
thus entitling the owners to compensation."1 These concerns about regulatory
takings will, at the very least, discourage regulators from freely exercising
their authority based solely upon environmental concerns.
A regulator might logically conclude that since permit denials can be con-
strued as takings that subject the government to expensive damage awards, it
might be better not to impose the regulation. In fact, the office of the Presi-
dent issued Executive Order Number 12,630 in 1988, entitled "Government
Actions and Interference with Constitutionally Protected Property Rights,"
which seems to invite such restraint.1 ' That order requires federal depart-
ments and agencies to review their actions so as to avoid "unnecessary takings
of private property interests."'1 2 It expressly directs federal decisionmakers to
consider "the risk of undue or inadvertent burdens on the public fisc."' 1 5 Some
commentators have expressed concern that this order represents "a drastic
shift away from the regulatory emphasis on environmental outcomes to an em-
phasis on the property rights of private landowners and developers."'1 4 It may
be however, that this order represents nothing more than an "increased sensi-
tivity" to constitutionally granted property rights.'" It is too early to assess
107. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 126-29 & n.6 (1985).
108. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 320-
21 (1987). Prior to this case, if a regulation was determined to constitute a taking, the government
could pay compensation and continue to enforce the regulation or simply rescind its action without
paying damages. The First English case requires damages for the temporary taking in the case
where the government rescinds its action. Id. First English did not offer any new guidelines for
determining when a regulation exceeds the limits of the Constitution, but merely spoke to the
issue of the appropriate remedy for invalid regulations. See Note, supra note 37, at 509.
109. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
110. Id. at 838-39. This holding was based on the Court's determination that the mitigation
measures required to obtain the permit (the easement) did not logically relate to or serve to lessen
the perceived problem (protecting the public view of the beach). Id. This has been called an
"unprecedented step of strictly scrutinizing a legitimate police-power regulation." Fisher, Execu-
tive Order 12630 and the Wetlands "Takings" Issue, 8 WATER LOG 6, 7 (1988).
11I. 53 Fed. Reg. 8,859 (1988).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Fisher, supra note 110, at 8.
115. Id.
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the impact of this order, or the new administration's willingness to enforce it.
These recent Supreme Court cases may have profound implications for the
nation's land use planning system. Environmental regulation is already an ex-
pensive proposition."' If development interests convince decisionmakers that
regulations may increase those costs, 117 it is not hard to envision regulatory
agencies compromising their programs.in order to avoid financial liability.' 18
Effective environmental protection requires that regulators be able to consider
the environmental impact of their actions without undue concern about poten-
tial financial liability."' This remains an emerging problem under CZMA.12 0
III. INTEGRATION AND THE PROPER ROLES OF GOVERNMENTS
CZMA experience indicates that integration is needed to protect the envi-
ronment most effectively, that integration requires the various levels of govern-
ment each to play important roles, and that integration requires advance plan-
ning. There has been a serious failing under CZMA, however, in developing
an overall advance plan for coastal management, beyond the scope of any indi-
vidual state's CMP. Since the creation of the Stratton Commission, it has
been recognized that coastal protection is not something that can be accom-
plished exclusively at any one level of government, 2 but there have been
116. For instance, the New Orleans District of the Army Corps of Engineers operates its per-
mit review program at a cost of $2.5 million a year. Houck, supra note 2, at 361-62. This figure
does not include the costs of operating the Louisiana coastal permit program, the EPA program;
nor does it include the costs associated with employing personnel from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality,
Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, and Louisiana parish (county) coastal programs.
Id. at 361-62.
117. Development interests have been quick to allege "takings" and threaten governmental lia-
bility in a wide range of local zoning matters. Houck, supra note 2, at 364 n.33.
118. Although CZMA was set up to provide funding for state coastal programs, this funding
was not intended to cover compensation to landowners for losses in property values due to exces-
sive regulation. Moreover, coastal regulatory systems were not constructed to absorb the potential
costs if regulations are found to constitute takings. See Note, supra note 37, at 510 (discussing the
California plan).
119. Environmental concerns are often subject to influence by economic concerns, but in most
cases courts and legislators have made clear that economic concerns should not override environ-
mental concerns. See, e.g., Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) (recognizing that eco-
nomic or technological infeasibility is not an excuse for failure to comply with the Clean Air Act).
120. Federal decisionmakers may also be affected by concerns about takings. See Florida Rock
Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 905 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987)
("If the instant case ... results in a substantial award against the government, the Army engi-
neers probably would want to consider whether the continued protection of 1,560 acres of wet-
lands was worth the damage to the public fisc."); see also Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg.
8,859 (1988) (entitled "Government Actions and Interference with Constitutionally Protected
Property Rights"; attempting to restructure federal wetlands programs so as to avoid "takings"
under the recent standards laid down by the Supreme Court).
121. See Archer & Knecht, supra note 6, at 110 ("The nature of ocean development projects
virtually ensure [sic] that they involve multiple jurisdictions. . . . Ocean development systems,
therefore, almost invariably require the positive cooperation of the local, state, and federal govern-
ments to be successful.").
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problems in defining the proper role for each level of government and for the
various agencies at any one level, The study of this history can lead to a better
understanding of the appropriate roles for each of the different levels of gov-
ernment in an integrated environmental protection scheme.
A. Governmental Roles Under CZMA
The Stratton Commission believed that primary responsibility for coastal
protection should be placed on the state, and this is how CZMA was originally
structured. 22 The idea was that major state responsibility would allow consid-
eration of local issues, while still drawing upon significant resources. The lim-
ited federal role was reflected in the concept of a consistency requirement.'2
The federal government, however, has not willingly complied with its limited
role. "The ultimate question for state and local governments is not whether
they can retain most of their regulatory authority in the coastal zone. Rather
it is whether they can keep any at all."124 The battle for power has led to
disharmony between states and the federal government, and has impacted on
the quality of protection provided to the coast.12 5
Local governments have been displeased with the way CZMA has been ap-
plied. Although local units are typically in charge of land use planning and
zoning issues,1 28 they have sometimes been seen as "push-overs" for develop-
ment interests.127 For that reason, local entities have not received primary re-
sponsibility for coastal protection under the Act.1 28 In fact, the whole legisla-
tive approach to coastal zone management has been called a "battleground for
conflicting philosophies over the distribution of powers between the state and
its local government subdivisions. 1 29 This, of course, has led to less coopera-
tion and coordination between different. levels of government. Nonetheless,
CZMA has been amended several times 80 and has achieved a degree of coor-
dination between the various levels. Although CZMA may not yet have
achieved the proper balance of powers, its history has helped define the proper
role for each level of government in a well-integrated environmental protection
scheme.
122. See NEWEST FEDERALISM, supra note 18, at ix.
123. See supra notes 55-75 and accompanying text.
124. Finnell, supra note 23, at 58-59.
125. See supra note 75.
126. See D. BROWER & D. CAROL, supra note 10, at 16 (noting that "[l]and-use planning has
traditionally been the responsibility of local government"); Finnell, supra note 23, at 40 (land use
planning is a field "traditionally subject mainly to state and local control"). For this reason, local
governments objected to the concept of a centralized process for handling "zoning matters." Hil-
dreth & Johnson, supra note 39, at 113-14.
127. Hildreth & Johnson, supra note 39, at 113. Distrust of local governments was at the heart
of many efforts to centralize coastal protection laws. Id. at 115.
128. Id. Still, almost all states have given local governments a large role to play in the coastal
management program. T. SCIIOENBAUM, supra note 23, at 493.
129. Marcel & Bockrath, supra note 63, at 887-88.
130. See supra note 9.
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B. The Local Role Under an Integrated Plan
Integration requires advance planning, and advance planning usually causes
one to think of "centralized (that is, federal) planning." However, local aes-
thetic, economic, and environmental needs are not uniform. Because coastal
protection is essentially a matter of land use planning, any integrated environ-
mental protection program requires the local government to take the lead,
with assistance, direction, and encouragement from the state and federal
governments.1 '
Local permitting boards must develop an idea as to what is needed by the
local economy and as to how much development can be allowed, not on a
piecemeal basis, but with a true eye toward the future. That plan should con-
form to local environmental and cultural characteristics, giving due considera-
tion to state, regional, and federal needs and should provide clear rules and
regulations. If plans are developed and discussed beforehand, then the permit
application process should be less difficult on the applicant, and the local envi-
ronment will be better protected.3 2 In this manner, environmental resources
can be protected, permit seekers can know what is permitted and what is for-
bidden, and taxpayers will not pay for redundant services. Advance planning
requires an active permitting board, not merely a reactive one. The federal
government could spur such activity by making grants dependent upon this
type of planning, and perhaps by sanctioning those localities that do not com-
ply. Ultimately, however, success or failure will depend on the efforts of local
planning boards. 3 This clearly seems to be the answer for coastal protection,
and it would seem to be appropriate for any integrated environmental protec-
tion scheme.
The local government should make most of the decisions that are likely to
affect people seeking to conduct activity in or about the local area, even
though these decisions must be in keeping with broad state and federal poli-
cies. Local governments are closer to the people affected by local activities and
are better able to assess local needs and desires. It is also logical for the local
government to administer the permitting process in large part and to initiate
the enforcement investigations and proceedings, immediately informing viola-
131. The American Law Institute, as well as the state of California, put the primary responsi-
bility for management of the coast at the local level. See Finnell, supra note 23, at 42-43; see also
Pelham, Hyde & Banks, supra note 13, at 542-43 (discussing how Florida law requires local
planning).
132. See supra notes 76-103 and accompanying text. An established plan might also alleviate
the risk of "takings" claims, see supra notes 104-120 and accompanying text, as purchasers of
land would have a record to refer to before they invested their money in the real estate.
133. Of course, local governments will still face problems such as lack of resources and poten-
tial susceptibility to development interests. This must be.recognized, and localities must be pro-
vided with necessary state or federal resources to handle the projects. Moreover, the locally pre-
pared advance plans must be sufficiently well defined so as to prevent a developer from forcing a
project past a local board. This will require difficult planning and preparation at all levels of
government, but such planning is warranted in the interest of integrated environmental protection.
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tors and suspected violators of their transgressions.1 8 4 Finally, the local govern-
ment should provide annual reports to the state, the federal government, and
the public. In that way, there is oversight to assure that the local plans are in
keeping with the broader federal, regional, and state plans.
C. The State Role Under an Integrated Plan
The state must play an important role in any integrated environmental pro-
tection program. The state is already deeply involved in air and water pollu-
tion issues and, hence, it is in a good position to work toward integration.8 8
The state also has many interrelated interests, such as housing, energy, and
transportation, which must be considered and should not be divorced from
coastal management decisions. 86 States also have more resources than local
governments, but do not create the same resentment that sometimes accompa-
nies federal action.' 7 For these reasons, it is reasonable to rest significant
power and authority to protect the environment at the state level, including
the right to deny federal development that is not consistent with the state's
plan. Legislators should recognize the importance of this feature in any inte-
grated environmental protection plan.1 8
States must also have a role in ironing out any difficulty between neighbor-
ing localities, just as the federal government must help out with interstate dis-
putes."' Geographic concerns do not always conform to jurisdictional bounda-
ries. At the same time, the state can serve as a type of clearinghouse for the
134. CZMA regulations require that where local governments take a lead in enforcement, the
state must retain oversight responsibility. 15 C.F.R. § 923.42 (1990).
135. W. ALLAYAUD, supra note 12, at 205-06. According to the 1990 Amendments:
Because of their proximity to and reliance upon the ocean and its resources, the
coastal states have substantial and significant interests in the protection, management,
and development of the resources of the exclusive economic zone that can only be
served by the active participation of coastal states in all Federal programs affecting
such resources and, wherever appropriate, by the development of state ocean resource
plans as part of their federally approved coastal zone management programs.
CZMA 1990 Amendments, supra note 9, § 6208(a) (amending 16 U.S.C. § 1451(m)).
136. See Finnell, supra note 23, at 44-45 (concluding such a divorce would be
"counterproductive").
137. See W. ALLAYAUD, supra note 12, at 52 ("[T]he appropriateness of state-level action is
reinforced by the fear of federal planning at the local level").
138. Consistency is, after all, one of the important "carrots" that was set forth to encourage
states to actively participate in coastal protection. D. BROWER & D. CAROL. supra note 10, at 6
(calling the consistency requirement a "major incentive"); Comment, Federal Consistency Under
the Coastal Zone Management Act, 7 U. HAW. L. REV. 135, 136 (1985) (calling consistency a
"perhaps more enticing" benefit); Comment, supra note 60, at 113 (calling the consistency re-
quirement "the Act's most important incentive for states to develop" a CMP). The 1990 CZMA
amendments purport to grant states more power in this area. CZMA 1990 Amendments, supra
note 9, § 6208 (amending 16 U.S.C. § 1456). Hopefully, courts will recognize this intent.
139. States' failure to handle this problem has been identified as a major problem under
CZMA. Lemonick, Shrinking Shores, TIME, Aug. 10, 1987, at 38, 47, reprinted in J. KALO, supra
note 18, at I, 6.
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exchange of information between counties within the state. 40 Finally, the state
should have a role in the oversight of local activity.14' Local planning boards
may lack the expertise or commitment to handle the job effectively.' 2 As
such, the state can play an important role in seeing that the counties are im-
plementing and conducting the local plans in accordance with the federal and
state management schemes.
D. The Federal Role Under an Integrated Plan
Although land use planning and zoning matters are usually handled at the
local level, 4" the commerce clause and the supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution empower Congress, if it so chooses, to preempt local land
management entirely." ' In the case of coastal management, some commenta-
tors have suggested a federal requirement that a certain percentage of coastal
property be set aside or protected."4 5 However, environmental resources vary
from locality to locality, as do the economic and aesthetic needs. Accordingly,
a centralized national plan would not be in the best interest of all localities. 4 '
Nevertheless, without an effective national program, there can be no truly ef-
fective integrated environmental protection.1, 7
The federal government must conduct or fund" 8 the comprehensive re-
search, provide technical assistance, and supply the data base that can be used
for decisionmaking across the country."" Rather than superimposing a plan
140. NEWEST FEDERALISM, supra note 18, at 74.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 21.
143. See supra note 126.
144. Finnell, supra note 23, at 32-37. The federal government has in fact assumed much of the
states' responsibility under CZMA. W. ALLAYAUD, supra note 12, at 53.
145. See D. BROWER & D. CAROL. supra note 10, at 14; Houck, supra note 2, at 405.
146. Of course, some coastal matters, such as issues that touch on national defense or critical
energy facilities, must be viewed from a national perspective, even though local concerns should be
considered. Finnell, supra note 23, at 55.
147. Archer & Knecht, supra note 6, at 117.
148. It is appropriate to call upon the federal government for funding. Kinsey, supra note 15,
at 100. Even though not all states (or, for that matter, all areas within a given state) are equally
affected by the coast, the coast is a national asset that provides benefits to all. CALIFORNIA
COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION COMMISSIONS, CALIFORNIA COASTAL PLAN 16-17 (1975) (discuss-
ing the national interest in the California coast). The public interest in the coastal zone includes:
its use for national defense, its timber and other minerals, electric power generated along the
shore, shipping ports, fish and other food products, aquatic life, and recreational purposes. Id. at
18; see also Archer & Knecht, supra note 6, at 117 (noting that the "federal government receives
national benefits from CZM far exceeding its financial contribution to state programs").
149. NEWEST FEDERALISM, supra note 18, at 72; Archer & Knecht, supra note 6, at 109 (call-
ing for "serious study and research at the national level"); Kinsey, supra note 15, at 100. CZMA
already authorizes Research and Technical Assistance Grants for this purpose and offers technical
assistance to the states. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1455a, 1456a, 1456b (1988), as amended by CZMA 1990
Amendments, supra note 9, §§ 6207, 6209, 6210; 15 C.F.R. § 933.1-.33 (1990). But see Archer
& Knecht, supra note 6, at 108, 115 (complaining that the "important and promising service[]"
of providing technical assistance to the states was largely curtailed after 1982).
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which is incapable of dealing with site specific needs, the federal government
should serve as a clearinghouse for local land use information. 150 This will
avoid duplication and decrease the costs that would be involved if each state or
locality were required to handle these matters separately. In playing this role,
it is reasonable for the federal government to structure the broad agenda for
environmental protection, outlining goals and defining objectives, as well as
informing states and localities specifically what is required "in the national
interest." 151 The federal government should also monitor the conditions that
exist and review state programs to make certain that state and local govern-
ments are protecting the national interest 52 Additionally, it is reasonable for
the federal government to provide enforcement assistance in cases where a
state or local governmental unit has requested assistance. 3
The federal government must also provide guidance about legal matters,
such as the possibility of states or local governments being found liable for a
taking. As long as decisionmakers carefully comply with the requirements set
forth in Nollan, state and local governments should be able to minimize the
risk of a taking.15 ' Strict guidelines issued by the federal government that are
drafted to meet the requirements of Nollan, and that localities can follow,
should ease concerns that permits will be granted out of fear or under eco-
nomic duress.1 5 5 Such guidelines would also put buyers on notice, reducing
their claims that "investment-backed expectations" require compensation. 156
Federal programs could also be written so as to support local governments that
150. See CZMA 1990 Amendments, supra note 9, § 6211 (amending CZMA by creating a
new section that deals with the dissemination of technical information). This has been identified as
one of the most important roles that the federal government has played under CZMA. Archer &
Knecht, supra note 6, at 107, 108.
151. Kinsey, supra note 15, at 101. The federal government has been criticized for not having
done this in the recent past. Archer & Knecht, supra note 6, at 104; see also supra note 40
(discussing how "the national interest" has not been well defined).
152. This review could also serve as part of the data base that the federal government would
maintain for use by states and localities that have similar problems. If a program has worked well
in one area of the country, it might work in a similar geographic area. Moreover, it is important to
know whether a type of program has failed elsewhere. See NEWEST FEDERALISM, supra note 18, at
72-73. For a suggestion on how federal oversight can be more beneficial to state planning agen-
cies, see Archer & Knecht, supra note 6, at 113-14.
153. NEWEST FEDERALISM, supra note 18, at 73. Some matters may simply be too difficult to
handle at the local or state level. Federal enforcement assistance would also mesh well with the
monitoring role for the federal government.
154. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 862 (1987) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that coastal commissions should have "little difficulty" in the future relating the
connection between the mitigation measure and the perceived public interest).
155. Executive Order 12,630 may be seen as an early effort along these lines, but it is too early
to assess its impact. See supra notes Il1-15 and accompanying text.
156. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See generally
Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations: Is There a Taking?, 31 WAS". U.J. URB. & CON-
TEMP. L. 3 (1987) (reviewing the meaning of "investment backed expectations" and examining its
applications).
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are found liable for a taking.15 7
The federal government must take the lead in developing coordination and
cooperation between the various levels of governments."' In general, the fed-
eral government should be aggressive in defending the environment from dan-
gers."59 If states see more federal concern about local environmental protec-
tion, their trust in the federal government will be bolstered. This should
improve cooperation and coordination between the various levels of govern-
ment. By assuring that all three levels of government are coordinated, it
should be possible to develop integrated plans, provide permit seekers with
information as to what is and what is not permitted, and generally provide
better protection for environmental resources.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is increasingly clear that effective environmental protection requires a
well-integrated statutory scheme. CZMA is the only major federal environ-
mental program that has adopted such an approach. Although it has not yet
ironed out all of its problems, CZMA has been marching toward internal inte-
gration for twenty years."" This Article has identified many of the problems
that have been encountered, and suggested a few solutions. One clear lesson is
that planners must be active at all levels of government, and recognition of the
proper role for each level is crucial. Each level of government has specific
strengths and weaknesses as they relate to integrated environmental protec-
tion. An integrated plan must take advantage of those strengths and avoid
unnecessary redundancy and interagency disputes.
The lessons learned from the CZMA experience should be applied to other
environmental protection statutes as the goal of a completely integrated
scheme is pursued. The goal of a totally integrated environmental program
may still be far in the distance, but this long journey can begin with a single
CZMA.
157. This would seem particularly appropriate where the state is required to regulate the activ-
ity in order to satisfy a federal statute. See J. KALO, supra note 18, at 34 (posing this as a
question).
158. Archer & Knecht, supra note 6, at 113.
159. Archer and Knecht have argued:
[T]he primary national CZM policy requires competent federal managers who can
work successfully with state officials, who understand coastal management, who will
advocate its principles and defend the program within the Executive and Legislative
branches of government, and who will act and be recognized as national program
leaders.
Id. at 109.
160. Professor Houck has suggested several "beginning principles" for coastal protection, in-
cluding: zoning or buying undeveloped coastline, developing new technologies for harvesting
coastal resources and for disposing of waste, upgrading water quality, and rebuilding the coast.
Houck, supra note 2, at 405; see also Archer & Knecht, supra note 6, at 116-17 (containing a list
of suggestions, including outside evaluations of state plans, advance planning by states, continued
federal financing, caution with oil exploration, and development of a national ocean policy
commission).
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